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WHEN DOES A WORK INFRINGE THE
DERIVATIVE WORKS RIGHT OF A
COPYRIGHT OWNER?
AMY B. CoHEN*
Consider the following fact situation: A, an artist, designs art
work and registers the copyright in that art work. A then licenses P
to publish note cards using the art work. The note cards are pub
lished by P and distributed to retail card stores. T purchases sev
eral hundred cards and then takes each card, glues it carefully to a
ceramic tile, and sells the tiles for a profit as "tile art" that purchas
ers can use to decorate walls, counters, even floors. If A now sues T
for copyright infringement, how should the court rule? Has Tin
fringed A's copyright?
In addressing cases involving facts much like these, the courts
have split. In Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co., 1 the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the creator of the tile art had infringed the art
ist's exclusive right to prepare derivative works based upon her
copyrighted art work. 2 That decision has been followed by two dis
trict courts in the Ninth Circuit in Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co. 3
and Greenwich Workshop v. Timber Creations. 4 On the other hand, in
Lee v. A.RT. Co., 5 the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the tile art
creator, concluding that the tile art was not an infringing derivative
work and that the defendant was entitled to make and sell the tile
art without incurring liability to the artist in accordance with the
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I would like to
thank Dean Donald Dunn for supporting this project with a research grant. I would also
like to thank Professor Mark Lemley, University of Texas School of Law, for his comments
on an earlier draft of this Article. Finally, I want to thank my husband and daughters for
all their love and support.
1 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
2 As provided by section 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright owner has
"the exclusive right to do and to authorize" the preparation of "derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994). A "derivative work" is defined by
the statute to be
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musi
cal arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, a "derivative work".
Id. § 101 (definition of "derivative work").
3 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), affd, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
4 932 F. Supp. 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
s 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
623
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first sale doctrine reflected in section 109(a) 6 of the Copyright Act
of 1976 ("1976 Copyright Act" or "1976 Act").
These differing outcomes have implications for copyright law
that go far beyond the simple fact pattern involved. In fact, many
of the policy assumptions that underlie copyright law are at stake in
deciding which of these outcomes is proper. At its core, this fact
pattern forces the courts to address the question of just what it
means to provide an artist with copyright protection. Is the artist
thereby ensured that any meaningful economic exploitation of the
copyrighted work is subject to her control, or is copyright protec
tion to be defined more narrowly, and if so, subject to what limita
tions? What are the limits of the personal property rights of those
who purchase material objects that contain works protected by
copyright?
This Article will address these questions, using the tile art sce
nario as the focal point. Part I describes generally the goals of
copyright law and the historical development of the copyright
owner's right to control the creation of so-called "derivative works."
Part II focuses on the Mirage and Lee decisions and the reasoning
used by these courts to reach their different outcomes. Part III
critiques both of these decisions and places them in the context of
other pertinent case law and commentary. Part IV provides anal
ternative approach to analyzing these issues.
I.
A.

THE HISTORY OF THE DERIVATIVE WoRKS RIGHT

General Background on Purposes of Copyright Law

It is considered axiomatic that copyright law is intended to
provide authors with sufficient protection so that they will be able
to reap economic rewards from their creations. This protection is
justified not merely to compensate authors for their labors, but to
provide potential authors with the incentive to create works in or
der to enrich public knowledge and well-being. 7 As the ConstituSection 109(a) of the Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized
by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
7 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors, but' [t]o promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.' [T]o this end, copyright assures authors the right
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and in
formation conveyed by a work.") (citation omitted); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("This limited grant [of copyright] is a means
by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
6
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tion provides, Congress is given the power to ensure for limited
times the rights of authors and inventors in order to "promote the
progress of science and the useful arts. "8 This balance between
compensating authors and promoting the public interest in access
to works of authorship has been described as the "incentives-access
paradigm." 9
Throughout the history of American copyright law Congress
and the courts have struggled to define the right way to balance
the author's interest in compensation and the public's interest in
access. At every point along the line of copyright decision making,
the question of balancing incentives and access has played a role,
be it in the context of determining the scope of protectable subject
matter, 10 the duration of copyright,U or the standards used to decreative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive con
trol has expired"). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works ofInformation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1805, 1866 (1990); William M. Landes &
Richard A Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989);
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REv.
989, 990-95 (1997); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv.
1197, 1197-1204 (1996); Christine Wallace, Overlapping Interest in Derivative Works and Com
pilations, 35 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 103, 104-07 (1984).
s U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, d. 8.
9 Glynn Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv.
483 (1996). Professor Lunney critiques the law's reliance on the incentives-access para
digm by illustrating, in economic terms, its underlying paradox: to the extent the law limits
copyright protection for those works most valued in order to serve the interests in public
access, it also limits the incentives available to authors to create those most valued works.
See id. at 554-71. Professor Lunney suggests that instead of relying on the incentives-access
paradigm, copyright law should be shaped by notions of allocative efficiency. He argues
that copyright law should provide only that degree of protection necessary to promote
parity between the economic value of copyrightable works and other products which have
comparable social value. To the extent copyright law provides too much protection, it
encourages overproduction of works at the expense of other valuable products; on the
other hand, if copyright protection is too narrow, then there will be underproduction of
copyrighted works and overproduction of other products. According to Professor Lunney,
the limited empirical evidence available suggests that copyright law should prohibit only
exact or nearly exact duplication in order to strike the right balance and promote alloca
tive efficiency. See id. at 594-656. See also Lemley, supra note 7, at 993-1000, 1013-29 (ana
lyzing the economic incentives justification and its effect on the creation of derivative
works); Sterk, supra note 7, at 1204-09.
1o For example, in Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990),Judge Easterbrook,
in analyzing the scope of protection granted to nonfiction works, observed that
[i]ntellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on
the work of others .... Once a work has been written and published, any rule
requiring people to compensate the author slows progress in literature and art,
making useful expressions "too expensive," forcing authors to re-invent the
wheel and so on ....
Yet to deny authors all reward for the value their labors contribute to the
works of others also will lead to inefficiently little writing, just as surely as exces
sively broad rights will do.
Id. at 1540-41. Having recognized this paradox and the need for the law to strike an appro
priate balance as best it can, the court relied on the idea-expression dichotomy and the
differences between fictional and nonfictional works to rule in favor of the defendant. See
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termine infringement. Our focus will be on this last question, and
more particularly, on the question of what kinds of uses of copy
righted material will infringe the copyright in that material in addi
tion to actual copying of the work itself.

B.

Historical Development of the Author's Right to Control the
Preparation of Derivative Works

In the early American copyright statutes the description of the
rights provided to copyright owners was quite narrow. The first
statute provided to authors of "any map, chart, book or books" the
sole rights only of "printing, reprinting, publishing or vending"
those works. 12 Even when musical compositions were added to the
list of protectable works in 1831, the author of such works was not
given a right to control performances of those works, but only the
rights of "printing, reprinting, publishing or vending" sheet music
representing those compositions. 13
As applied by the courts, these rights did not even protect an
author against an unauthorized translation of her work into an
other language, as Harriet Beecher Stowe learned when she unsuc
cessfully sued the author of an unauthorized German translation of
her classic novel, Uncle Tom's Cabin. 14 In rejecting her claim, the
court reasoned that the "only property ... which the law gives to
[the copyright owner] is the exclusive right to multiply copies of
the particular combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes
of another the ideas intended to be conveyed." 15 In other words,
copyright protected against only visually perceptible reproductions
also Warner Bros. v. American Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (analyzing the
scope of protection afforded characters and observing that copyright law "has the capacity
both to augment and diminish creativity. By assuring the author of an original work the
exclusive benefits of whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law obviously
promotes creativity. At the same time, it can deter the creation of new works if authors are
fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be substantially similar to preexist
ing works."). See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 347-53; Lunney, supra note 9, at
506-26.
11 In justifying the change, from the Copyright Act of 1909 to the Copyright Act of
1976, to a term of copyright measured by the life of the author plus 50 years, Congress
relied upon both longer life expectancy of authors, see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134
(1976) ("The present 56-year term is not long enough to insure an author and his depen
dents the fair economic benefits from his works."), and the effect an insufficiently long
term would have on authors' incentives to produce, and thus the public interest in the
production of, and access to, works of authorship, see id. ("[T]oo short a term harms the
author without giving any substantial benefit to the public .... In some cases the lack of
copyright protection actually restrains dissemination of the work, since publishers and
other users cannot risk investing in the work unless assured of exclusive rights.").
12 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
13 See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.
14 See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 13,514).
15 /d. at 206-07.
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of the copyrighted work. "A translation may, in loose phraseology,
be called a transcript or copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but
in no correct sense can it be called a copy of her book." 16
It was not until1856 that Congress began to expand the scope
of the copyright owner's rights, albeit slowly. In 1856 Congress for
the first time provided that dramatic compositions could obtain
copyright protection and further provided that the owner of such a
copyright had the "sole right to act, perform, or represent the
same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any
stage or public place." 17 That is, even where no physical copy had
been made of that dramatic composition, one who performed the
work on any stage or public place without the permission of the
copyright owner would infringe the copyright. Thus, it was no
longer an essential element of every form of copyright infringe
ment that the plaintiff prove that the defendant had "multipl[ied]
copies of the particular combination of characters" 18 used by the
plaintiff. Even more significant changes came in 1870, when Con
gress provided that "authors may reserve the right to dramatize or
translate their ... works," 19 and in 1891, when Congress granted to
authors the automatic rights of dramatization and translation of
literary works, without the need of reservation. 20 Thus, by the end
of the nineteenth century Congress was beginning to expand the
scope of the copyright owners' rights; it w~ now clear that copy
right law could be used to protect against more than just verbatim
copies of an author's works.
The really dramatic shift in the scope of protection occurred,
however, early in the twentieth century when Congress enacted the
1909 Copyright Act and provided explicitly that a copyright owner
had the exclusive right not only to "print, reprint, publish, copy
and vend the copyrighted work," 21 but also to
translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects,
or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to drama
tize it if it be a non-dramatic work; to convert it into a novel or
other non-dramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt it
if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be
a model or design for a work of art . . . .22
16

/d. at 208.
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870).
18 Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 207.
19 Act of july 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 (repealed 1909).
20 See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1107 (repealed 1909).
21 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1 (a), 35 Stat. 1175 (repealed 1976).
22 /d. § 1 (b) (emphasis added). The expansion of the copyright owner's rights to in
clude a derivative works right is also described in Ralph S. Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are
17

HeinOnline -- 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.

627 1999

628

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 17:623

In other words, a copyright could be infringed when a two-dimen
sional design was transformed into a three-dimensional work or
when a piece of music was adapted or arranged for use with differ
ent instruments or voices or when a literary work was changed
from one language to another or from one category to another
(dramatic to non-dramatic or vice-versa).
This expansion of the copyright owner's rights can be ex
plained in both philosophical terms and economic terms. It may
reflect an expanded idea of the nature of art and the creative pro
cess;23 it may also reflect a recognition of new economic markets
that authors could exploit, for example, motion pictures or sound
recordings, and that Congress thought should be reserved to au
thors and not to the public at large. 24 Whatever the explanation, it
is clear that the author's rights were expanded and that courts now
had new problems to solve in determining infringement of those
rights. Just how similar did a dramatization have to be in order to
infringe the rights in a novel? Did the plaintiff's actual language
have to appear, for example, as dialogue in the dramatization, or
were just plot and character similarities sufficient? As the courts
struggled with these questions, some were conservative, only find
ing infringement in limited circumstances, 25 but as more time
Derivative Works Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARoozo ARTs & ENT. LJ. 1, 2 (I984); Ginsburg,
supra note 7, at I874, I88!HI8; Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copy
right, 30 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'v 209, 211-I5 (I983); Lunney, supra note 9, at 534-46; Naomi
Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REv. I213, 1233-39 (1997); Wallace,
supra note 7, at 105-10; Michael Wurzer, Note, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare
Derivative Works: Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REv. I52I, I522-26 (I989).
23 See Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichot
omy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value judgments, 66 IND. LJ. I75, 203-10 (I990); Ginsburg,
supra note 7, at I88I-90; Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1254-55.
24 See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 2II, 2I6-18 ("[T]he subsequent growth in legitimate
theaters, motion pictures and television opened vast new markets for derivative uses, impel
ling Congress to grant derivative rights to copyrighted works and to grant copyright protec
tion to the derivative works created .... "); Voegtli, supra note 22, at I237-38.
25 In several early cases involving motion pictures which were alleged to infringe liter
ary works, the courts found no infringement. In so doing, these courts found that the
similarities in theme or in common plot devices were insufficient to find infringement.
The reasoning did not rely so much on notions of the idea-expression dichotomy as on a
standard for infringement which required that an ordinary observer recognize that the
film was taken from or based upon the plaintiffs copyrighted work. See, e.g., Kustoff v.
Chaplin, I20 F.2d 55 I, 559-60 (9th Cir. 194I); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d I, 2728 (9th Cir. I933); Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126, I28 (S.D. Cal. I927).
See generally Lunney, supra note 9, at 537-40.
On the other hand, in King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924), the
court found that the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs cartoon character by manufac
turing toy figures which resembled that cartoon. The court's definition of the scope of
copyright protection given pursuant to the I909 Copyright Act was quite broad: "Copying
is not confined to a literary repetition, but includes various modes in which the matter of
any publication may be adopted, imitated or transferred with more or less colorable altera
tions. The disguise of the source from which the material was derived does not defeat the
protection of the copyright .... " /d. at 535. Thus, this court did not focus on audience
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passed, courts became more willing to find infringement based on
less obvious similarities between the new work and the work upon
which it was based. 26 The trend of expanding copyright owners'
rights thus continued.
Balanced against this expansion of the copyright owner's
rights, however, were certain legal doctrines that provided limita
tions on those rights and certain protection for those who used
copyrighted works. One of the most fundamental of those limita
tions is reflected in the legal doctrine known as the "first sale"
doctrine.

C.

First Sale Doctrine

In the nineteenth century courts recognized that the exclusive
right of the copyright owner to vend copies of the copyrighted
work was not limidess. In Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, 27 the
court reasoned that the copyright owner's right to the intangible
interest in the intellectual property was to be distinguished from a
legitimate purchaser's rights in the personal property that con
tained that intellectual property.
This copyright incident of control over the sale, if I may call it
so, as contradistinguished from the sale incident to ownership
in all property[ ]-copyrighted articles like any other[ ]-is a
thing that belongs alone to the owner of the copyright itself,
and as to him so long as and to the extent that he owns the particular
copies involved. lVhenever he parts with that ownership, the ordinary
incident of alienation attaches to the particular copy parted with, in
favor of the transferee, and he cannot be deprived of it. 28

This reasoning was later relied upon in Harrison v. Maynard,
Merrill & Co., 29 where the court concluded that there was no copy
right infringement claim against a party who resold damaged
recognition but on whether plaintiff's expression had been taken, even if altered and
disguised.
26 See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1983) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on plot and thematic
similarities between Star War.s and Battlestar Galactica); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that defendant's film infringed plaintiff's
play, based on plot and thematic similarities); Universal City Studios v. Film Ventures Int'l,
Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134 (C. D. Cal. 1982) (granting plaintiff preliminary injunction against
defendant based on plot and thematic similarities between jaws and Great White); Metro
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op Prods. Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (holding that musical-comedy condensed version of Gone With the Wind was an in
fringement). See generally Cohen, supra note 23, at 220-29; Lunney, supra note 9, at 544-46.
27 27 F. 914 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886).
28 Id. at 925 (emphasis added).
29 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894).
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books salvaged after a warehouse fire where the copyright owner
had already conveyed title to those books to the warehouse owner.
[T]he right to restrain the sale of a particular copy of the book
by virtue of the copyright statutes has gone when the owner of
the copyright and that copy has parted with all his title to it, and
has conferred an absolute title to the copy upon a purchaser,
although with an agreement for a restricted use. The exclusive
right to vend the particular copy no longer remains in the
owner of the copyright by the copyright statutes. The new pur
chaser cannot reprint the copy. He cannot print or publish a
new edition of the book; but, the copy having been absolutely
sold to him, the ordinary incidents of ownership in personal
property, among which is the right of alienation, attach to it. 30
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 1908 in BobbsMerrill Company v. Straus, 31 agreeing with these lower courts that

once the copyright owner had sold the tangible object in which the
copyrighted work was expressed, the owner of that tangible object
had a right to alienate that object without accounting to the copy
right owner. The Court reasoned that the main purpose of the
copyright statutes was "to secure the author the right to multiply
copies of his work" 32 and that the statutory grant to the copyright
owner of the "sole right" to vend copies of the work must be read
in light of that purpose. As so read, the Court concluded that sell
ing a legitimately acquired copyrighted book for less than the retail
price required by the copyright owner might be a breach of con
tract in some circumstances, but was not itself an infringement of
the copyright owner's sole right to vend the copyrighted work.
This so-called "first sale" doctrine was included as part of the
federal copyright statute in the 1909 Copyright Act. Section 27 of
that Act provided:
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material ob
ject copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or other
wise, of the material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer
of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright con
stitute a transfer of the title to the material object; but nothing in
this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any
copy of a copyright work the possession of which has been lawfully
obtained. 33
30
31
32
33

Jd. at 691.

210 u.s. 339 (1908).
/d. at 347.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 27, 35 Stat. 1175 (repealed 1976) (emphasis added).
The copyright owner's right to distribute the work was reflected in section 1 of the 1909
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Thus, the law recognized that there was a difference between the
property interest in the copyrighted work expressed in a material
object and the property interest in the material object itself and
that the ownership interests in these two property interests could
be entirely separate and independent of each other. The copy
right owner did not automatically have a property interest in the
material object and thus could not on the basis of the copyright
statute control further sales or transfers of that object by one who
had a legitimate property interest therein.
As construed by the courts, this section and the doctrine it
reflected provided significant protection to those accused of copy
right infringement. It was held, for example, that overhauling and
reconstructing secondhand sets of the copyright owner's books was
not copyright infringement; 34 that rebinding and combining the
copyright owner's comic books with other comic books was not
copyright infringement; 35 and that repainting and then selling the
copyright owner's hobby horse was not copyright infringement. 36
In each case the court focused on the defendant's title to the mate
rial object containing the copyrighted work and the plaintiff's fail
ure to prove copying by that defendant. 37
This doctrine imposed some limits thereby on the rights of the
copyright owner to control all the economic benefits that are de
rived from copyrighted works. Since the legitimate owner of a
copyrighted book, for example, is free to resell that book and not
account to the copyright owner for any portion of that resale, the
copyright owner is denied potential earnings from the sales of his
or her work. This doctrine is thus an instance where the law chose
to favor the interests in public access over the interest in maximiz
ing the incentives provided to copyright owners.
D.

The 1976 Act

Both the exclusive right of the copyright owner to prepare deCopyright Act, which provided the copyright owner with the right to "print, reprint, pub
lish, copy and vend the copyrighted work." !d. § 1 (emphasis added).
34 See Bureau of National Literature v. Sells, 211 F. 379 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
35 See Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publ'g Co., 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
36 See Blazon v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
37 See id. at 420 ("[B]efore there can be infringement there must be both an averment
and some proof of copying ... , and as a matter of logic there can be no copying in the
case at bar where the horse seized and alleged to copy [plaintiff's hobby horse] is in fact
[plaintiff's hobby horse] ... .");Fawcett Publications., 46 F. Supp. at 718 ("[T]he defendant
has not multiplied copies but merely resold the plaintiff's under a different cover.... The
Defendant is not charged with copying, reprinting or rearranging the copyrighted material
.... "); Bureau of Nat'l Literature, 211 F. at 382 ("[Plaintiff's] exclusive right of sale of a
particular copy is gone when it parts with the title to such copy.").
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rivative works and the first sale doctrine were included by Congress
in its major revision of the federal copyright statute in 1976. Sec
tion 106(2) of the 1976 Act explicitly provides that the copyright
owner has the exclusive right to "prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work" 38 and to authorize such preparation
by others. The Act defines a "derivative work" as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionaliza
tion, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifica
tions which, as a whole, represent an original work of author
ship, is a "derivative work." 39
Congress used language broader than that used in the 1909 Act,
for not only are additional specific types of derivative works men
tioned, but the language also includes as a derivative work "any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted," a general catchall phrase presumably intended to cover
those types of derivative works not specifically identified. In this
way Congress broadened the copyright owner's rights and
incentives.
On the other hand, the 1976 Act also specifically provided for
the first sale doctrine. Although the Act provides the copyright
owner with the exclusive right to "distribute copies or pho
norecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or oth~r
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending," 40 that right is
subject to the limitations provided for in section 109(a) of the Act:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title,
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord. 41
17 u.s.c. § 106(2) (1994).
/d. § 101 (definition of "derivative work").
Id. § 106(3).
Id. § 109(a). Since the original enactment of the 1976 Act, Congress has amended
section 109 to limit the scope of the first sale doctrine with respect to commercial rentals of
certain types of works. Section 109 now provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by the own
ers of copyright in the sound recording or the owner of copyright in a com
puter program (including any tape, disk, or other medium embodying such
program), and in the case of a sound recording in the musical works embodied
therein, neither the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in pos
session of a particular copy of a computer program (including any tape, disk,
38
39
40
41
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What happens when this first sale doctrine and the rights it
provides to personal property owners clash with the derivative
works right and the protection it is intended to provide to copy
right owners? That is, in legal terms, what the tile art situation is all
about: do the rights of the copyright owner to prepare derivative
works outweigh the rights of the personal property owner to alter
and resell the note cards that it has legitimately purchased?
II.
A.

.MIRAGE AND

LEE AND

THEIR ANTECEDENTS?

Cases Decided under the 1909 Copyright Act

The difficult questions that arise when the derivative works
right conflicts with the first sale doctrine are clearly illustrated by
two older cases addressing similar fact situations and reaching op
posite conclusions. First, in National Geographic Society v. Classified
Geographic, Inc., 42 the District Court of Massachusetts ruled that the
defendant had infringed the plaintiffs copyrights in its magazines
by cutting out articles, compiling and binding together articles on
similar subjects, and then selling these bound volumes to the pub
lic. Even though the defendant had not copied any of the plain
tiff's articles, but had just resold the pages cut from magazines that
the defendant had legally acquired, the court concluded that the
defendant had infringed the plaintiffs copyright by violating the
plaintiffs exclusive right to "compile, adapt or arrange its copy
righted work." 43 The court rejected the suggestion that, as owners
of lawfully acquired secondhand copies of the plaintiffs magazine,
the defendants were entitled, on the basis of the first sale doctrine,
to create and sell these adaptations.
In contrast, three years later in Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Elliot
Publishing Co., 44 the District Court for the Southern District of New
York relied on the first sale doctrine in concluding that the defend
ant in that case was not liable for copyright infringement when it
purchased secondhand copies of the plaintiffs copyrighted comic
books and rebound them with other comics, some belonging to
the plaintiff and some to third parties. The court observed that
or other medium embodying such program) may, for the purposes of direct or
indirect commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
possession of that phonorecord or computer program ... by rental, lease, or
lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or
lending....
.
17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). These changes indicate some expansion of the copyright
owner's rights and some contraction of the personal property owner's rights.
42 27 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1939).
43 Id. at 659.
44 46 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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"the defendant has not multiplied copies but merely resold the
plaintiff's under a different cover. The exclusive right to vend is
limited. It is confined to the first sale of any one copy and exerts
no restriction on the future sale of that copy." 45
The court neither cited nor referred to the National Geographic
case, though it did conclude its opinion by stating that the defend
ant had not been charged with "copying, reprinting or rearranging
the copyrighted material." 46 Unlike the defendant in National Geo
graphic, which had separated articles from the issues in which they
appeared and then combined with other articles from other issues,
the defendant in Fawcett had taken whole comic books and com
bined them with other whole comic books without taking anything
apart. Although that factual difference can explain the different
outcomes, it is also possible to argue that the individual magazine
articles as separate whole works were no more "rearranged" than
the Fawcett comic books. 47
That critical point has been the key distinguishing issue be
tween those cases that have ruled in favor of plaintiffs and those
ruling in favor of defendants when the derivative works right has
clashed with the first sale doctrine. The outcome in these cases
most often has depended on whether or not the court has treated
the defendant's use as a "rearrangement" or "transformation" in
fringing the derivative works right.
For example, in C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 48 the first "tile art"
case, the defendant had used a process to transfer the plaintiff's art
work, expressed on cards and other objects purchased by the de
fendant, to ceramic plaques. First, the court considered whether
this process involved copying. The court concluded that it did not,
as it involved the use of plaintiff's actual image on the ceramic
plaque. In reaching this conclusion, the court also considered it
significant that "[e]ach ceramic plaque sold by defendant with a
Paula print affixed thereto requires the purchase and use of an
individual piece of artwork marketed by the plaintiff." 49 In other
words, Paula would receive compensation for every copy of her
work used and sold by the defendant.
Id. at 718.
/d. (emphasis added).
47 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F. 3d 1381, 1389 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en bane) ("If you make verbatim copies of 95 pages of a 316-page book, you
have not transformed the 95 pages very much-even if you juxtapose them to excerpts
from other works and package everything conveniently."). See also Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) (treating one article in magazine as
"whole work" for purposes of fair use analysis).
48 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
49 /d. at 191.
45

46
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The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that defendant's ce
ramic plaques were adaptations over which the plaintiff was given
exclusive rights pursuant to section 7 of the 1909 Copyright Act. In
response to the plaintiff's reliance on National Geographic, the court
noted that that case had never been cited with approval. The court
concluded that the process used by the defendant did not result in
a "compilation, adaptation, or arrangement as those terms are con
templated by Section 7 of the [1909] Copyright Act," 50 and that
"while an individual is afforded the protection necessary to allow
exploitation of other media," 51 the law did not proscribe the ac
tions taken by the defendant in creating the ceramic plaques using
the plaintiff's copyrighted art. Beyond that, the court did not ex
plain why the use of the art on the plaques did not fall within that
area of protection afforded copyright owners.
Finally, the court relied on the first sale doctrine to protect the
defendant against the plaintiff's claim that its exclusive right to
vend its copyrighted work had been infringed. The court observed
that once the copyright owner has consented to the sale of copies
of its work,
continued control over the vending of copies is not so much a
supplement to the intangible copyright, but is rather primarily a
device for controlling the disposition of the tangible personal
property which embodies the copyrighted work. Therefore, at
this point the policy favoring the copyright monopoly for au
thors gives way to the policy opposing restraints of trade and to
restraints on alienation. 52

AS we will see in the next section, addressing cases decided under
the 1976 Copyright Act, not all courts tipped the scales in this same
direction.
B.

Mirage and Its Progeny

In Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co., 53 the Ninth Circuit
considered a fact situation remarkably similar to that addressed by
the Paula court. The defendant had purchased books containing
copyrighted art prints and then cut out the prints, glued them to
ceramic tiles, and sold the tiles. The plaintiffs were the copyright
owners and licensees of the prints used by the defendant, and
claimed that the defendant, by creating the tile art, had, inter alia,
50
51
52
53

Id. at 192.
/d.
Id. at 191 (quoting M. NIMMER,
856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).

CoPYRIGHT§

103.3 (1972)).
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infringed the derivative works rights of the copyright owner. The
court agreed:
What [defendant] has clearly done here is to make another ver
sion of [plaintiff's] art works, ... and that amounts to prepara
tion of a derivative work. By borrowing and mounting the
preexisting, copyrighted individual art images without the con
sent of the copyright proprietors ... [defendant] has prepared a
derivative work and infringed the subject copyrights. 54

In response to the defendant's contention that the tile art was not
a derivative work, the court pointed to the language in section 101
of the 1976 Act defining a derivative work as one in which a work is
"recast, transformed or adapted," and concluded:
By removing the individual images from the book and placing
them on tiles, perhaps the [defendant] has not accomplished
reproduction. We conclude, though, that [defendant] has cer
tainly recast or transformed the individual images by incorporat
ing them into its tile-preparing process. 55

The court also rejected the defendant's assertion that the first
sale doctrine protected its further sales of the art prints contained
in the books that had been legally acquired. The court reasoned
that the first sale doctrine did not provide the personal property
owner with a right to prepare derivative works, but only the right to
transfer the material object itself. "The mere sale of the book to
the [defendant] without a specific transfer by the copyright holder
of its exclusive right to prepare derivative works, does not transfer
that right to the [defendant] ." 56
Thus, by treating the tile art as a "derivative work," the court
could find infringement and avoid the protection given personal
property owners through the first sale doctrine. In two subsequent
decisions involving similar facts, the district courts within the Ninth
Circuit have followed Mirage and ruled for the plaintiffs. First, in
Muiioz v. Albuquerque A.R T. Co., 57 the same defendant had taken
individual note cards which contained the plaintiff's copyright art
work and had mounted those cards on ceramic tiles. The defend
ant then made the same arguments made in Mirage: that the tile art
was not a derivative work and thus was protected by the first sale
doctrine. The defendant this time claimed that the tile art was
54
55
56
57

Id. at 1343 (citations omitted).
/d. at 1344.
/d.
829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), affd, 38 F.3d 1218 (1994).
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merely a means of displaying the art work, no different from plac
ing art work in a frame. The court disagreed:
Placing a print or painting in a frame and covering it with glass
does not recast or transform the work of art. It is commonly
understood that this amounts to only a method of display.
Moreover, it is a relatively simple matter to remove the print or
painting and display it differently if the owner chooses to do so.
Neither of these things is true of the art work affixed to a ce- ·
ramie tile. Moreover, these tiles lend themselves to other uses
such as trivets (individually) or wall coverings (collectively). 58

The court thus concluded that the tile art was an infringing deriva
tive work and ruled in the plaintiff's favor.
Similarly, in Greenwich Workshop v. Timber Creations, 59 the Dis
trict Court of the Central District of California ruled in the plain
tiff's favor, relying on both Mirage and Munoz, even though the
facts in this case were somewhat different. In Greenwich, small scale
reproductions of watercolor paintings were published in a book in
which the plaintiff owned the copyright. The defendant had cut
the reproductions out of the book and then transposed them on to
canvas, matted, framed and sold them as individual pictures. The
plaintiff claimed that by so doing, the defendant had created unau
thorized derivative works and thus infringed its copyright.
The defendant responded by relying on the language in
Munoz, which distinguished the infringing tile art from the non
infringing act of framing a picture for display. The defendant ar
gued that its conduct amounted to nothing more than an "alterna
tive method of display" 60 and was not the creation of a derivative
work. The defendant further asserted that to be a derivative work,
something "substantially different" 61 had to be created. The plain
tiff responded by distinguishing framing a work from defendant's
conduct, which involved permanently removing the art reproduc
tions from the book first and adapting them into works to be hung
from the wall.
The court agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant had cre
ated derivative works and thus infringed its copyright. The court
reasoned that the defendant had "clearly 'recast' and 'trans
formed' [the book] by physically removing the pages and adapting
them into works of art to hang on the wall," 62 and that this conduct
58
59
60
61
62

/d. at 314.
932 F. Supp. 1210 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
Id. at 1213.
ld.
Id. at 1215.
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was "not equivalent to simply framing a work of art for display
•
purposes." 63
These cases demonstrate how, by broadly defining the deriva
tive works right, the courts can provide the copyright owner with
expansive protection and limit the effects of the first sale doctrine.
In the next section, we examine a case in which the court took a
different approach; by imposing a higher threshold for defining a
derivative work, the court provided narrower protection to copy
right owners and broader rights to the personal property owner
relying on the first sale doctrine.
C.

Lee v. A.R T. Co.

In the most recent "tile art" case, the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, and then the Seventh Circuit, took a
different approach to the issues dealt with in Mirage and its prog
eny. In Lee v. A.R T. Co., 64 the defendant had purchased the plain
tiffs copyrighted note cards and then mounted them on to
ceramic tiles and sold them as "tile art." The plaintiff sued for
copyright infringement, arguing that her right to prepare deriva
tive works had been infringed and citing Mirage and Munoz as
support.
The district court first rejected the distinction between fram
ing art and mounting it on tiles that had been relied on in Munoz.
The district court reasoned that
[b]oth framing and tiling utilize the same works purchased
from the copyright holder and do not involve "copying" as de
fined by the Copyright Act. Both processes involve trimming
the original image to fit it to the appropriate size of the tile or
frame respectively, securing the image to the tile or mat with
some type adhesive [sic] or clip, and covering the art with a
clear covering, epoxy resin and glass respectively. 65
The district court further observed that "the eventual manner of
display and the 'use' of a product is not dispositive" 66 of the issue of
whether a work is a derivative work.
According to the district court, "the only relevant query for
the court is whether ART's ceramic tile process transforms, adapts or
recasts Annie Lee's original work into a new and different original
63 Jd.
64 Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub nom. Lee v. A.R.T.
Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
65 Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. at 580.
66

/d.

HeinOnline -- 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.

638 1999

1999]

DERIVATIVE WORKS RIGHT

639

work." 67 The district court concluded that unless the defendant's
work was itself sufficiently original to be copyrightable, it could not
be a derivative work and thus could not be an infringement of the
plaintiff's exclusive right to prepare derivative works. 68
Having concluded that a work was not an infringing derivative
work unless it was original, the district court then applied the stan
dard to the tile art created by defendants and concluded that since
it was not original, it was not infringing.
The mundane act of placing notecards onto a ceramic tile falls
into the narrow category of works in which no creative spark
exists. Thus, the ceramic tiles are not a new and different origi
nal work, but the same exact work placed onto a different back
ground. ART did not display any creativity in gluing Annie
Lee's work onto the separate surface .... No intellectual effort
or creativity was necessary to transfer the notecard to the tile. It
does not meet the definition of a "derivative work." 69
Ironically, since the defendants were not creative, they were
granted more protection against liability than if they had been.
Since the defendants had not infringed the derivative works
right as analyzed by the district court, they were then able to rely
on the first sale doctrine to insulate themselves from liability for
merely reselling the material objects they had legitimately acquired
when purchasing the plaintiff's note cards. The district court ob
served that
ART made no changes, alterations, reproductions, transforma
tions, or adaptations of the notecards and, instead, resold the
Id. (emphasis added).
The district court based this conclusion on the statutory definition of a "derivative
work" and on C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1973), discussed supra
notes 48-52, and a more recent case, Paramount Pictures Cmp. v. Video Broad. Sys., 724 F.
Supp. 808 (D. Kan. 1989).
In Paramount, the defendant had added commercials to the blank lead-in tape on
videocassettes containing plaintiff's copyrighted motion pictures, and plaintiff sued, claim
ing that defendant had infringed its exclusive right to prepare derivative works. The court
rejected the claim that adding the commercials constituted creation of a derivative work
because "[t]he plaintiff has not presented any authority to support the conclusion that the
mere addition of a commercial to the front of a videocassette recasts, transforms, or adapts
the motion picture into what could represent an 'original work of authorship.'" /d. at 821
(emphasis added).
Interestingly, the Paramount court had distinguished the case before it from Mirage,
finding that adding commercials to a videocassette did "not resemble in any way the re
moving of a page from an artwork book and mounting it onto a tile as a separate piece of
art for sale." Id. The Lee court failed to mention that observation in its own reliance on
Paramount. Instead, the Lee court placed weight on the use of the word "original" by the
Paramount court in concluding that a work could only be considered an infringing deriva
tive work if it met the standards of originality. See also infra text accompanying notes 107111.
69 Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. at 581.
67
68
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same notecards using a different method of display. This resale
is permissible under the Copyright Act. 70
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judg
ment for the defendant, though on slightly different grounds. 71
First, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, seemed to conclude
that even if the "tile art" was itself a "derivative work," it should not
be considered an infringement of Lee's copyright because "an al
teration that includes (or consumes) the original lacks economic
significance." 72 As in the Paula case, the court found it significant
that the defendant had to purchase a copy of the plaintiffs art for
every piece of tile art it sold. The court reasoned that "[b]ecause
the artist could capture the value of her art's contribution to the
finished product as part of the price of the original transaction, the
economic rationale for protecting an adaptation as 'derivative' is
absent." 73 The court therefore seemed to be urging an economic
effects analysis as the best test for determining when a use of a
copyrighted work constituted an infringement of the derivative
works right.
The court did not, however, end its analysis there. It went on
to consider whether in fact the tile art was a "derivative work" as
defined by the statute. Judge Easterbrook agreed with the district
judge that there was no difference between framing a work of art
and mounting it on tiles for purposes of determining copyright in
fringement, and that therefore the Ninth Circuit's reliance on that
distinction was misplaced. Judge Easterbrook went further in criti
cizing the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit by observing thar that
court had "erred in assuming that normal means of mounting and
displaying art are easily reversible. A painting is placed on a
wooden 'stretcher' as part of the framing process; this leads to
some punctures ... , may entail trimming the edges of the canvas,
and may affect the surface of the painting as well." 74 The Seventh
Circuit rejected the notion that the permanence of the changes
made by the derivative artist should determine whether or not the
work made is a derivative work.
70 Id. at 582. The District Court of Puerto Rico has agreed with the Lee district court
that a derivative work must itself be original in order to be infringing. See Precious Mo
ments, Inc. v. La Infantil, 971 F. Supp. 66 (D.P.R. 1997) (holding that bedding items manu
factured with lawfully acquired fabric with plaintiff's copyrighted design were non
infringing derivative works due to absence of any originality in such bedding items).
71 See Lee v. A.R.T, 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
72 Id. at 581.
73 Id. This view has recently been criticized in Note, Copyright Law-Derivative Works

Seventh Circuit Holds That Mounting Copyrighted Notecards on Ceramic Tiles Does Not Constitute
Pret;.aration of Derivative Works in Violation of the Copyright Act, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1365 (1998).
4 Lee, 125 F.3d at 581.
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The Seventh Circuit did not, however, rely on the lower
court's demanding definition of "derivative work" to justify judg
ment for the defendant. Judge Easterbrook recognized that there
was a split in the case law and in scholarly commentary with respect
to whether a new work itself had to be "original" in order to in
fringe the derivative works right, but then concluded that
"[f]ortunately, it is not necessary for us to choose sides." 75 For pur
poses of the decision, the court instead assumed that a non-origi
nal work could be an infringing derivative work if it fit within the
first sentence of the statutory definition of a derivative work, i.e., "a
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which the work may be recast,
transformed or adapted." 76 The court then concluded that the tile
art did not fall into any of the specified categories, nor did it "re
cast", "transform" or "adapt" the plaintiff's art work. Judge Easter
brook observed that " [ t] he art was bonded to a slab of ceramic, but
it was not changed in the process. It still depicts exactly what it
depicted when it left Lee's studio." 77 To hold such a minor altera
tion infringing would lead to a slippery slope, the court feared,
resulting in liability for those who used the note cards as note pa
per on which to write or as coasters for their drinks. The Seventh
Circuit refused to define copyright law in a way that would allow
artists to "block any modification of their work of which they disap
pr.<?ye"78 and affirmed the district court's judgment for the
defendant.
The Lee case thus reflects a far different approach to the bal
ance between the derivative works right and the first sale doctrine
than that taken by the Mirage court and its progeny. By imposing a
more demanding test for when the use of a copyrighted work will
infringe the derivative works right, the Seventh Circuit granted less
protection to copyright owners and more to those who purchase
copyrighted works.
Thus, the differences between the approach of the Ninth Cir
cuit and that of the Seventh Circuit reflect different choices as to
how to balance the rights of copyright owners to control uses of
their works by others and the rights of others to use and to profit
75

/d. at 582.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "derivative work").
77 Lee, 125 F.3d at 582.
,
78 /d.

76
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from further distribution of such works. 79 A look at the scholarly
comment in this area may help to determine how best to make the
correct choice in striking that balance.

III.

BAIANciNG THE "DERIVATIVE

WoRKS

RIGHT" AND THE Pusuc

INTEREST IN CREATING DERIVATIVE

WoRKS

We have seen that originally copyright owners were only pro
tected against literal copying of their works; even translating a work
into another language did not infringe the copyright. Certainly
transforming a work into another medium did not infringe. 80 Sim
ilarly, copyright law has long provided that once the copyright
owner has sold copies of its work, those who acquire those copies
legally are entitled to distribute those particular copies again,
whether for a price or not. 81
We have also seen, however, that over the last 100 years or so,
copyright law has expanded the protection given to copyright own
ers by providing increased rights to control adaptations and trans
formations of their works from one medium to another. 82 Today
that right is reflected in section 106(2) of the 1976 Act and its pro
vision that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare
and to authorize the preparation of derivative works. 83 As con
strued by some courts, that right has given copyright owners tre
mendous control over those who use their works, even when the
copies have been legally acquired. 84
This expansion comes at a cost, both generally to society and
specifically to those who would create derivative works. In order to
understand this consequence of the expanded derivative works
right, it is important to return to the incentives-access paradigm
and our fundamental beliefs about the importance of copyright.
The traditional explanation for copyright protection rests on
an economic rationale: copyright protection is necessary, especially
given the availability of easy and low cost copying technology, be
cause copyright owners would face direct competition by those
79 One author has distinguished the cases factually and reconciled them on that basis.
Specifically, the author found it significant that in Mirage the defendant had cut the art
work out of a book whereas in Lee the defendant had mounted notecards sold as individual
works. The author reasoned that a copyright owner who permits his or her work to be
included in a collective work does not thereby give away the right to "decompile" that
collective work and sell the works individually. See Steve Lauff, Decompilation of Collective
Works: When the First Sale Doctrine Is a Mirage, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1365 (1998).
80 See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 27-37.
82 See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
83 17 u.s.c. § 106(2) (1994).
84 See supra text accompanying notes 53-63.
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copyists who would "free ride" on the copyright owner's creative
expression and bear only those minimal copying costs. This com
petition would undermine substantially the copyright owner's op
portunity to reap financial rewards from the work and thereby
undermine the incentives to create that work in the first place. 85
Professor Paul Goldstein, one of the leading copyright schol
ars, has argued that in applying the derivative works right, the
courts have failed to pay sufficient attention to the incentives struc
ture underlying the copyright system. 86 Goldstein suggested that
the proper approach to use in determining whether the derivative
works rights has been infringed "is [to inquire] whether the grant
of such a right is needed [1] to attract the appropriate amount of
investment to the underlying work's expression and [2] to channel
this investment in appropriate directions." 87 Unlike a reproduc
tion, a derivative work may not directly compete with the underly
ing work and may in fact provide additional benefits to the public
by building on that original. Before giving the creator of the un
derlying work too much control, these factors should be taken into
consideration.
Professor Stewart Sterk in fact criticized on economic terms
the expansion of copyright protection through the derivative works
right. 88 He described the incentives justification for such ex
panded protection as flawed. Although he agreed that "[i]f free
riding copyists could appropriate the gain associated with works of
authorship, some authors would find it worthwhile to abandon au
thorship for other pursuits," 89 he also stressed the costs of copy
right protection and the extent to which it may discourage, rather
than encourage, creative efforts: "expanded copyright protection
increases the cost to authors by requiring them to obtain permis
sion when they seek to build upon existing work." 90 He concluded
that "the optimal copyright system would not seek to maximize the
number of works created, but, in recognition of the costs of copy
right, would withdraw protection even when marginally more pro
tection would result in a marginal increase in creative activity."91
As it was then applied to current doctrine, Sterk found that
See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 252; see also 2 PAUL GoLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT § 5.3 at
5:79 (2d ed. 1998) ("Derivative rights enable prospective copyright owners to proportion
their investment to the returns they hope to receive not only from the market in which
their work will be first published, but from other, derivative, markets as well").
87 Goldstein, supra note 22, at 230.
88 See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1204-26.
89 Jd. at 1207.
90 Jd.
91 Id. at 1209.
85
86
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copyright law was tipping too far in favor of protection without giv
ing due consideration to those costs. 92 In the specific case of deriv
ative works, Sterk concluded that "[t]he broad protection
copyright doctrine extends to derivative works ... appears gener
ally inconsistent with the incentive justification for copyright."93
He reasoned that, except in those cases where the expected earn
ings from derivative works are disproportionately large compared
to the expected earnings from the underlying work, a derivative
works right is not needed to provide the economic incentives to
create that underlying work. 94 The creator will be motivated suffi
ciently by the earnings expected from that underlying work.
Professor Glynn Lunney would also define the derivative works
right more narrowly and would impose a demanding test for in
fringement of that right. Specifically, Professor Lunney would im
pose a standard of infringement that would require the copyright
owner to show exact or nearly exact duplication of the underlying
work. "[A] ny significant transformation of or variation from the
underlying work should preclude a finding of infringement even if
the underlying work remains recognizable." 95 Professor Lunney
justified this demanding test based on notions of allocative effi
ciency; he concluded that granting the copyright owner broader
protection would result in the inefficient overproduction of works
of authorship. 96 Of course, by relieving derivative users of liability
where significant changes are made to the underlying work, Profes
sor Lunney's approach would, ironically, also encourage the crea
tion of those new derivative works.
Professor Mark Lemley made a broader point with respect to
the policy ramifications of the expanded derivative works right. He
argued that such expanded protection undermines the public in
terest in the progress of science and the useful arts by placing obSee id. at 1209-25.
!d. at 1217.
94 See id. at 1215-16. Sterk also rejected two other economic justifications for the deriva
tive works right, which had been suggested in Landes & Posner, supra note 7. The first,
that a derivative works right enables an author to release a work without delaying to pre
pare derivative works, Sterk considered flawed based on the argument that with the deriva
tive works rights authors might delay production of derivative works in order to ensure
greater sales of the underlying work. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 1216-17. As for the second
Landes and Posner economic justification-that a derivative works right is efficient be
cause it reduces transaction costs by enabling licensees of derivative works to deal with only
one copyright holder-Sterk pointed out that without that right, licensees would not have
to deal with the underlying work's owner at all. See id. at 1217. Cf Landes & Posner, supra
note 7, at 354-55. See also Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1240-47 (agreeing with Sterk that deriv
ative rights are not easily justifiable based on economic incentives theory).
95 Lunney, supra note 9, at 650.
96 !d. at 646-54.
92

93
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stacles in front of those seeking to create "improvements."97 Like
Professors Lunney, Sterk, and Goldstein, he reasoned that copy
right law can be justified on an economic incentive basis "only to
the extent that on balance [it] encourage[s] enough creation and
dissemination to offset [the] cost[]" of limiting dissemination of
ideas and raising the price of those works. 98 Moreover, Lemley fo
cused on the social costs such rights impose on the creation of new
works that build upon and improve the underlying works:
"[E]fficient creation of new works requires access to and use of old
works. And since 'improvements' may in many cases dwarf the
original work in terms of their practical significance, dynamic mar
ket efficiency over different generations demands such access as
well." 99 Because the derivative works right impedes such access by
those who seek to improve a copyrighted work and, more impor
tantly, denies copyright protection for most improvements if done
without the permission of the owner of the copyright in the under
lying work, according to Lemley, this allows the copyright owner to
capture too much value: not only the value of the underlying work
but of the improvements as well. 100
He concluded that this result is inefficient and based on
flawed assumptions about how copyright owners will behave in li
censing the creation of "improvements," that is, derivative works.
Lemley argues that given the realities of the licensing marketplace,
for example, the transaction costs, the uncertainties, the difficulties
locating improvers, and the resulting undervaluing of improve
ments, the current scheme gives too much economic power to
copyright owners, leading to underproduction of derivative works
or "improvements." 101
Lemley would remedy this situation by modifying copyright
law to create a doctrine parallel to the "blocking patent" rule,
which provides patent protection for inventions added to already
patented inventions while still holding that new inventor liable for
infringing the existing patent. 102 Lemley would incorporate this
concept into copyright law in part by granting copyright protection
to the original aspects of derivative works even if those works also
97 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1074.
98 !d. at 997.
99 !d. (citations omitted).
1oo Id. at 1018-24. Lemley contrasts this to the doctrine of "blocking patents" in patent
law, see id. at 1000-13, and finds no basis for the difference in treatment in copyright law, see
id. at 102942.
101 See id. at 1046-72.
102 See id. at 1000-13.
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infringe the copyright in the underlying work. 103 By adopting such
a rule, Lemley reasons that the creator of the derivative work will
have increased bargaining power, thus leading to greater efficiency
and more appropriate valuation of derivative works. 104
Thus, there is significant commentary criticizing in economic
and policy terms an overly broad derivative works right. Given this
recognition of the need to limit the derivative works rights of the
creator of the underlying work in order to provide access for new
works or "improvements" to be made by others, 105 it is important to
return to the district court's analysis in the Lee case and that court's
test for what constitutes an infringing derivative work. As we have
seen in the Lee district court opinion, the test is whether or not the
defendant's work itself is an original work of authorship. If the
derivative user has not added something "new and different,"
something "original" to the underlying copyrighted work, then ac
cording to the Lee district court, there is no "derivative work" as
defined by the statute, and thus the copyright owner's exclusive
right to create derivative works has not been infringed. 106
103 See id. at 1073-77. Lemley also argues for using the fair use doctrine to protect "radi
cal improvers," i.e., those who make such a major tran.sformation of the underlying work
that the added value relative to the amount of the underlying work copied justifies a hold
ing of nonliability even in the case of a showing of direct harm to the copyright owner. See
id. at 1077-83. This concept would not aid the creators of tile art since under Lemley's
definition it is not a radical improvement over the underlying art work. See also Wallace,
supra note 7, at 126-31 (arguing that the creator of a derivative work should get copyright
protection for original contributions, but not for mere transformation of a work into a new
form or medium).
104 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1075.
105 Some of those who see copyright owners as entitled to broad protection may justify it
on the basis of a natural or personal rights theory. That is, as creator, the author should
have some control over how and in what form his or her creation is used. Under this view
an artist is not motivated purely by the desire for economic rewards, but also by the sense
of personal satisfaction that comes with artistic and personal expression and the public's
recognition of the work's aesthetic value. That artist may therefore feel entitled to stop
those who place her art in a commercial context, such as tile art, which offends that artist's
sense of propriety, regardless of the economics of the matter. See 2 GoLDSTEIN, supra note
86, § 5.3 at 5:80-81; Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REv. 1, 25-47 (1988); Ginsburg, supra note
7, at 1867; Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO
ST. LJ. 517 (1990).
One response is that that is not the concern of copyright law, that American copyright
law does not itself recognize moral rights or reputational interests, but is entirely con
cerned with providing only sufficient economic rewards to provide incentives to create in
the interest of public betterment. An artist whose concern is reputational harm should
instead rely on the law of unfair competition or, in those limited circumstances where it
applies, the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T., 125
F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing moral rights in tile art context). See also Lem
ley, supra note 7, at 1031-34 (concluding that derivative works right serves economic pur
poses and is not based on moral rights notions); Sterk, supra note 7, at 1230-40 (criticizing
non-economic justifications for copyright); Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1250-60.
106 See Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. 576, 580-82 (N.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub nom. Lee
v. A.R.T., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
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In reaching this conclusion, the Lee district court relied on the
statutory definition of a "derivative work" in section 101 of the 1976
Act, which provides in pertinent part that "[a] 'derivative work' is a
work based upon one or more preexisting works ... or [upon] any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elab
orations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work."' 107 The first sen
tence· does not even mention originality; only in the second sen
tence of the definition does Congress specifically mention
originality as a requirement. While the Lee court and others 108
read this originality requirement to apply in determining if the de
rivative works right had been infringed, it is better to read that re
quirement as applicable only in determining if a particular work is
copyrightable as a derivative work. Although the statute does not
make this explicit, it makes more sense to require originality only
in the context of determining copyrightability.
Moreover, the sources relied upon by the Lee district court
only discuss the requirement of originality for a derivative work to
be copyrightable. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act
stated that a derivative work "is copyrightable if it represents an 'orig
inal work of authorship. "' 109 The cases which were cited by the Lee
district court are cases in which the courts had ruled that a deriva
tive work is not copyrightable unless it is original. no
It is entirely consistent with the general scheme of copyright
law to require originality before granting copyright protection to a
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of"derivative work") (emphasis added).
Professor Goldstein had disagreed with the notion that to be infringing, a derivative
work had to be original, and concluded that the statute did not support such a conclusion.
See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 229-31 & n.75. In his more recent treatise, however, he
seems now to believe that for a work to infringe the derivative works right, it must itself
contain original work. "[F]or the derivative right to be infringed, defendant must have
created a derivative work, and for a derivative work to have been created, the Act requires
the contribution of expressive content capable of standing on its own as a copyrightable
work." 2 GoLDSTEIN, supra note 86, § 5.3 at 5:82. For this reason, Professor Goldstein
concluded that Mirage had been incorrectly decided. See id. See also 2 NIMMER ON Copy.
RIGHT§ 8.12[C] (1998) (criticizing Mirage for concluding that first sale doctrine did not
apply because the tile art constituted an adaptation); Voegtli, supra note 22, at 1267-69
(author would restrict definition of derivative works, in part by including only one that
"exhibits little originality of its own or that[ ] unduly diminishes economic prospects of the
works used").
109 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) (emphasis added).
110 These cases did not involve infringement of the right to prepare derivative works, but
the eligibility of certain works for copyright protection as derivative works. See Woods v.
Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995) (concerning whether musical arrangement quali
fies as a derivative work for purposes of statutory protection against termination of trans
fers); American Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714 (N.D. Ill.
1996), available in 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5809, No. 92 Civ. 5909 (May 1, 1996) (concerning
copyrightability of dental coding system), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
107

108
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work; it is a completely different matter when the issue is infringe
ment. This rigid and unrealistic insistence that the definition of a
derivative work for purposes of determining copyrightability also
be applied when the issue is infringement has also been criticized
by others. 111
In fact, it makes little sense to hold only the most creative
users of copyrighted material liable. Professor Lemley, for exam
ple, would not apply his "blocking" rule to what he labels "minor
improvers." 112 By this he means derivative works which add noth
ing sufficiently original to be considered copyrightable.U 3 The cre
ators of these works would therefore not get the benefits of the
increased bargaining power and, under Lemley's scheme, the copy
right owner of the underlying work would be entitled to capture
the full value of that "minor" improvement. As applied to the "tile
art" scenario, it would thus seem that the owner of the underlying
artwork should be entitled to hold the "tile art" creators liable for
copyright infringement, assuming that adding the art work to tile is
not considered sufficiently original to be copyrightable and is thus
just a "minor improvement." 114
Both Professors Lunney and Lemley would provide more pro
tection to the derivative user who has made some significant
I l l See Elisa Alcabes, Unauthorized Photographs of Theatrical Works: Do They Infringe the Copy
right, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1032, 1036-38 (1987); Wallace, supra note 7, at 114. Both of these
authors concluded that the law should impose a different standard for defining an infring
ing derivative work (substantial similarity) than for defining a copyrightable derivative
work (originality). According to Wallace, "[p]roof of infringement should be more diffi
cult, because the protection it gives to authors may impede the free flow of information
and ideas." Wallace, supra note 7, at 114 (citation omitted). Similarly, Alcabes noted that
"[t]he higher 'infringement standard' discourages the over-monopolization of original ex
pression by requiring an author to show more than mere copyrightability in order to prove
infringement of his derivative rights." Alcabes, supra, at 1036-37. These authors clearly did
not conclude that the statutory definition of a derivative work defined the test for infringe
ment of the derivative works right. See also Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697
F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1982) ("A work which makes non-trivial contributions to an existing
one may be copyrighted as a derivative work and yet, because it retains the 'same aesthetic
appeal' as the original work, render the holder liable for infringement of the original
copyright if the derivative work were to be published without permission from the owner of
the original copyright."); Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971)
("The tests for eligibility for copyright and avoidance of infringement are not the same.")
112 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1074.
113 See id. at 1019-20.
114 See Lee v. Deck the Walls, 925 F. Supp. 576, 581 (N.D. Ill. 1996), affd sub nom. Lee v.
A.R.T., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Lemley's approach is the opposite of that
taken in Lee. a creator of an original derivative work is given more, not less, protection in
infringement actions. Lemley, however, noted that the approach of those courts, such as
the Ninth Circuit in Mirage, which allows the derivative works right to "preclude owners of
a particular copy of a work from altering or transforming that copy notwithstanding the
first sale doctrine ... has been controversial." Lemley, supra note 7, at 1018. He also
recognized, however, that the first sale doctrine as provided for in section 109(a) of the
1976 Copyright Act does not apply to the creation of derivative works from the copy ob
tained after that first sale. See id. at 1018 & n.143.
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changes to the underlying work than to one who has made no or
only trivial changes.U 5 The less a defendant has contributed to the
"progress of the useful arts and sciences," the more willing the law
should be to hold that defendant liable. The approach of the dis
trict court in Lee does just the opposite: it penalizes only the user
who has made an original contribution. Thus, from both a policy
and statutory point of view, the approach taken by the Lee district
court is questionable. Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant has made an original contribution before holding
that defendant liable does not make a great deal of sense. Non
original derivative works should also be considered potentially
infringing.
On appeal, the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in the
Lee case avoided the issue of originality by concluding that the tile
art was not a derivative work because it did not "recast, transform
or adapt" the underlying work, since what was depicted in that un
derlying work had not been changed. Unfortunately, it is not clear
what the court meant by "changing" what has been "depicted."
Would a two dimensional photograph of a sculpture "change" what
that sculpture depicted? Would a photograph change what a
painting depicted, for that matter? Such uses of art have generally
been considered infringing, though neither is truly a "copy" of the
underlying work.U 6 The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "re
cast, transformed or adapted" does not shed much light on where
the line should be drawn between a use that infringes the deriva
tive works right and one that does not.
On the other hand, the approach taken by the Mirage, Munoz,
and Greenwich courts to define "recast, transformed or adapted" is
also subject to criticism. These courts concluded that cutting art
work out of a book and matting it or placing note cards on ceramic
tiles was infringing, as the art work was thereby "transformed." The
opinions distinguished these activities from simply framing a pic
ture based in part on the permanence of the change made by the
See supra notes 95-96 & 102-04 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 F. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1907) (holding that photograph
of statue infringes copyright in statue). Cf Leigh v. Warner Bros., 10 F. Supp.2d 1371 (S.D.
Ga. 1998) (holding that party was not lawfully allowed to photograph sculpture in ceme
tery without owner's permission); Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, 741 F. Supp. 1107
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding photograph of sculpture to be a derivative work based on that
sculpture), vacated, 760 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Varon v. The Santa Fe Reporter, 218
U.S.P.Q. 716 (D.N.M. 1982), available in 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17359 (concluding that
artist had right to require permission before her paintings were photographed); MJ.
Golden & Company v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 137 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (holding
sketch of three-dimensional plaque to be infringement of copyright in plaque).
115

116
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derivative works creator.U 7 That distinction is not persuasive. It is
true that once the note cards are glued and lacquered to tiles they
cannot be used as note cards again; it is also true that reproduc
tions once cut out of a book cannot be returned to that book. A
framed picture, on the other hand, can usually be taken out of the
frame or reframed. But why does this distinction matter in terms
of determining infringement? The courts simply state without fur
ther explanation that one is a transformation and the other is not.
Where is the line to be drawn, and why? Would these courts con
sider it an infringing transformation if the framer had used an ad
hesive such as Superglue to attach the mat, glass and frame to the
art work? That would make the change as permanent as gluing it
to tile, but should that be enough to render that framer liable? As
correcdy pointed out by Judge Easterbrook in the Lee opinion, us
the focus on the permanence of the change would seem to lead to
ridiculous hairsplitting. Furthermore, it seems to have no connec
tion with the underlying concerns of copyright law. The perma
nence of the change itself does not seem to have a connection to
either the incentives provided to copyright owners or the public
interest in access to the underlying work.
Thus, the question remains as to how to define "recast, trans
formed or adapted." In applying that language to a particular
work, it is first important to recognize that derivative uses can
either "consume" the underlying work by incorporating an actual
copy119 of that work into the derivative work, or can exploit that
work in a "public goods" mode, meaning uses that allow the deriva
tive user to purchase only one copy of the underlying work and
then "replicate the attraction of the underlying work from a single
copy ... to satisfy many derivative consumers with only one copy of
the underlying work." 120 With public goods uses, the derivative
user need not incorporate an actual copy of the underlying work
into each copy of the derivative work produced. When a derivative
work does not "consume" an actual copy of the underlying work,
but uses that work in a public goods mode, almost by definition
that underlying work has been "recast, transformed or adapted,"
See supra notes 5~3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
119 In this context an "actual copy" refers to the copy of the work as fixed by or under
the authority of the copyright owner into a material object, not a duplication of that copy
by someone else. Thus, when an artist produces prints of her art work, each print is an
"actual copy." If someone was to take one of those prints and make duplications by photo
copying or othe!Wise, those duplicates would not be "actual copies" as referred to herein,
but reproductions of the actual copy.
120 Lunney, supra note 9, at 634.
117

118
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since it is being used in a different format or medium. For exam
ple, a book turned into a movie or a cartoon character turned into
a plush toy has certainly been "recast, transformed, or adapted."
Thus, those public goods uses can certainly be considered to fit
within the statutory definition of a derivative work.
Should all such uses be considered infringing regardless of
their originality? 121 Professors Goldstein, Sterk, Lunney, and Lem
ley seem to suggest that such a view could overcompensate the
copyright owner of the underlying work and cause undesirable
costs for society, either in terms of general allocation of resources
or in terms of failing to stimulate the creation of new works based
on the underlying works. 122 The debate over the actual need for
copyright protection to stimulate creative efforts is not new, 123 and
as long as copyright protection continues to exist, there can be no
real test of copyright's role in stimulating authors to create works
of authorship. When it comes to public goods uses, however, a de
rivative user who can make and distribute multiple copies of a de
rivative work without purchasing a copy of the underlying work for
each derivative work distributed is reaping significant benefits,
which should at least be shared with the copyright owner of that
underlying work. By assuming such users to be liable for copyright
infringement, the law encourages negotiation between the copy
right owner and the derivative user instead of allowing the deriva
tive user to use the work without compensating the copyright
owner. As both would seem to gain from a license allowing the
derivative use, a fair accommodation compensating both parties
may in fact result. Obviously, this is what does occur in the case of
most films based on novels and most plush toys based on cartoon
characters: a license agreement satisfactory to both sides is negoti
ated, and the public benefits from the creation of the new work.
There does not appear to be a need to deny the copyright owner
protection in order to stimulate the creation of these new deriva121 For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that enough of the original expression in
the underlying work has been copied by the derivative user so that the derivative work is
"substantially similar" to the underlying work. See generally Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copy
right Decisionmaking: The Meaningf£ssness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 719
(1987).
122 See supra notes 80.104 and accompanying text.
123 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case far Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 322 (1970) ("[T]he case for copy
right ... rests not upon proven need, but rather upon uncertainty as to what would hap
pen if protection were removed."). Compare Barry Tyerman, The Economic Rationale far
Cofryright Protection far Published Books: A Reply to Professar Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REv. 1100
(1971), with Stephen Breyer, Cofryright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REv. 75 (1972). See also
Landes & Posner, supra note 7.
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tive works. 124
On the other hand, the issues are different when a derivative
work does not make a public goods use but instead "consumes" an
actual copy of the underlying work for each derivative work cre
ated. Even in such cases, as is the case with tile art, the underlying
work has arguably been "adapted" and even "transformed" or "re
cast," as the Ninth Circuit concluded in Mirage. 125 There are, how
ever, policy reasons to treat these derivative uses differently.
·Professor Lunney argued that the derivative works right must be
limited to allow copyright owners to control only those uses that
reflect a "public good" aspect. Uses that require the derivative user
to purchase a number of copies of the underlying work reasonably
proportionate to the number of derivative consumers to be satis
fied, as in the case of tile art, should not be infringing, according
to Professor Lunney, because such uses do not affect copyright
owners significantly or differently in economic terms from deriva
tive uses of other types of products. 126
Thus, Professor Lunney would not find the creation of "tile
art" as described in Mirage and Lee to be infringing because it does
not exploit this "public good" aspect of works of authorship. 127 As
pointed out long ago in the Paula decision, 128 for every piece of tile
art created, the defendant must have purchased a copy of the
plaintiff's copyrighted art work. In this way the plaintiff has some
control in terms of reaping economic rewards; the copyright owner
has the benefits of that first sale. That distinguishes this situation,
for example, from the situation in which the novelist's book is
turned into a film; that defendant need not purchase a copy of the
book for every film made. Thus, the novelist has much less of an
opportunity to control the economic rewards to be derived from
her work. With tile art, on the other hand, the compensation de
rived from the first sale may be sufficient to reward the copyright
owner of that art work. 129 The tile art creator, even if not consid124 Professor Lemley's suggestion may be an even better solution: give the derivative
user copyright protection for any original contributions even if that user is technically in
fringing the copyright in the underlying work. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 1073-77. Such
an approach might more fairly balance the negotiations between the copyright owner of
the underlying work and the derivative user.
125 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).
126 See Lunney, supra note 9, at 634-43.
127 See id. at 641-43 & 641 n.506.
128 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. Under this analysis the economic ra
tionale does little to justify an expanded derivative works right in general and certainly
does not provide a basis for concluding that "tile art" is infringing.
129 This is similar to the concern expressed in Professor Sterk's comment that a deriva
tive works right is not needed except where the expected earnings from the derivative
works are disproportionately large when compared to the expected earnings from the un-
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ered "original," has paid that price and the other costs of manufac
turing that tile.
This conclusion, however, is itself based on some questionable
assumptions. Future artists may now be able to anticipate uses of
note cards in the form of tile art, but did Lee? Was she able to reap
the economic rewards of this use of her art by charging an appro
priate price for its use on the note cards? In Lee, Judge Easter
brook wrote about the opportunity that the artist had "to capture
the value of her art's contribution to the finished product as part
of the price for the original transaction," 130 but was that in fact true
in that case? Returning to the hypothetical posed at the start of
this article, when A licensed P to use her art on note cards, did A
anticipate the extra profits that could be made by Tin making and
selling tile art? Did Panticipate that value in pricing the note cards
themselves?
These questions bring us back to a point made by the Munoz
court in distinguishing framing a picture from placing a picture on
ceramic tile. The court considered the first to be a "commonly
understood . . . method of display" of the art work whereas the
second was not. 131 Cases interpreting "infringement" have gener
ally not reflected a concern with customary usage of copyrighted
works or the expectations of the copyright owner. Rather, that in
quiry has generally focused on the degree and type of similarity
between the works. 132 An alternative approach relied upon by a
few courts 133 and favored by some commentators 134 asks whether
the new work supplants demand for the original copyrighted work.
Although that approach may at first glance seem related to this
notion of customary use, its focus is on the effect of the new work
derlying work. As applied to the "tile art" scenario, this reasoning could result in a finding
of no infringement. The expected earnings from the art work itself might not be out
weighed by the expected earnings of the "tile art." The artist would not be discouraged
from creating the artwork if denied the tile art earnings, as long as the rewards from the
sales of the art work itself were under his or her control.
130 Lee v. A.R.T., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997).
131 Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Alaska 1993), affd, 38
F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
132 See generally Cohen, supra note 121; Goldstein, supra note 22, at 224-26.
133 See, e.g., West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data, Inc. 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating
that Mead's use of West's page numbers would infringe West's copyright in part because
"consumers would no longer need to purchase West's reporters to get every aspect of
West's arrangement"); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic lnt'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that circuit boards which speed up the play of copyrighted video games infringe
those copyrights in part based on demand for speeded up versions of such games).
134 See, e.g., Michael Wurzer, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative Works:
Reducing Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1521 (1989); Nadan, A Proposal to Recognize Compo
nent Works: How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1633,
1655 (1990).
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on demand for the original work, not on whether the new format
used to present the original work is one that the copyright owner
would ordinarily expect. Professor Goldstein, however, has sug
gested that the derivative works right in general, as opposed to the
right to reproduce, 135 will be infringed when new expressive ele
ments have been added (making it thereby more than a reproduc
tion) and a new market has been created. 136 Thus, Goldstein
suggests that a work, to infringe the derivative works right, must
appeal to a market different from the one to which the underlying
work appeals. 137 This question, like that asked by the Ninth Circuit
in Mirage, seems to focus on whether the derivative user has found
a new way of exploiting the work, a use perhaps not anticipated by
the creator of the underlying work in determining the price to be
charged for the sale or use of that underlying work.
Perhaps there is in this reasoning a way of reconciling the ap
proaches of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits. In determining if the
derivative works user should have to compensate the creator of the
underlying work for a particular use, Judge Easterbrook would ask
whether the creator had an opportunity to "capture the value of
her art's contribution" to that derivative use. If the derivative use is
a customary non-public goods use of such a work, then it is reason
able to assume that the creator had such an opportunity, but if the
derivative use is not customary or is a public goods use of the work,
then that opportunity to charge a price reflecting that value did
not exist. Framing a painting is a customary way to resell art work,
and thus, the creator of that art work should charge a price th~t
reflects the value to the framer/reseller of that underlying art
when resold as framed art. Placing note cards on tile and reselling
it as "tile art" was arguably not customary and thus constituted a
new market that the artist did not anticipate when she determined
1 35 The 1976 Copyright Act provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right to
"reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
136 See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 217.
137 See id. at 227-32. In addition to his attention to incentive theory and the market for
derivative works, see supra text accompanying notes 86-87, Goldstein also argues that deter
mining infringement of the derivative works right should focus principally on the degree
and type of similarities in expression between the underlying work and the derivative work
and whether or not they are substantial. He would limit the copyright owner's control to
uses of the protectable expression in the underlying work; only derivative uses that substan
tially reproduce that expression or transform it as necessary to the change in medium will
be infringing. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 231-32. Goldstein also argued that copyright
remedies for infringing the derivative works right should be applied carefully so as not to
provide the copyright owner with more than is necessary to protect its investment in the
underlying work. See id. at 236-239. Like Lemley, he would provide some greater protec
tion to those who create original derivative works than the law currently provides. See id. at
243.
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the price for her note cards. Thus, when a non-public goods deriv
ative use is not a customary use, the copyright owner should argua
bly be entitled to compensation.
In her discussion of a common law tort for misappropriation
of intellectual property, Professor Wendy Gordon seemed to sug
gest a rule that would have the opposite effect. 138 One element of
her suggested tort of "malcompetitive copying" is that the defend
ant's copying must "take[] sales from plaintiffs actual or expected
market." Professor Gordon reasoned that if the defendant's use
had no "competitive nexus" to the plaintiffs actual or expected
market, then the defendant had not harmed the plaintiff in a way
that would entitle that plaintiff to restitution. 139
The competition requirement works to assure that defendant's
gain is at plaintiff's expense because if the plaintiff is serving, or
is about to enter the market where the free rider is selling ele
ments of the plaintiff's work, then allowing the free rider to con
tinue likely will hurt the plaintiff by taking her customers. 140
Professor Gordon, however, also recognized the limitations of
this principle and has observed that in the case of copyright and
derivative works, Congress had taken a broader approach. 141
Gordon has written elsewhere that copyright owners should be en
titled to revenues beyond these actual or expected markets in cer
tain circumstances because "it is desirable for authors to be
responsive to the public demand in new areas as well as established
ones, and a rule of law that denied authors compensation except to
their 'expected' markets could cause line-drawing problems that
would dampen the incentive that new markets would bring." 142
Thus, copyright owners arguably are entitled to compensation for
harm done by copying in new markets as well as in actual and ex
pected markets.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue, but it
has spoken about the copyright owner's rights to claim harm to the
"potential market for or value of the copyrighted work" 143 in the
context of fair use determinations. These decisions shed some
light on what the Court considers to be the market that a copyright
138 See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992).
139 Id. at 238-42.
140 /d. at 239-40 (citations omitted).
141 See id. at 247-48 & 248 n.377.
142 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343, 1385 (1989) (citations omitted).
143 17 u.s.c. § 107(4) (1994).
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owner is entitled to control and to preclude others from invading
or harming. For example, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 144 the Supreme Court observed that "the fair use doc
trine was predicated on the author's implied consent to 'reason
able and customary use' when he released his work for public
consumption." 145 Thus, a use outside of what is reasonable and
customary would generally not be considered a protected fair use.
Moreover, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 146 the Court rea
soned that a copyright owner does not necessarily suffer lost li
cense fees from a parody of its work because the copyright owner
presumably would never have licensed a parody in the first place.
The Court observed that "[t]he market for potential derivative
uses includes only those the creators of original works would in
general develop or license others to develop. "147 The Court thus
did not limit the copyright owner to uses already anticipated and
licensed. Rather, it would in addition grant protection in markets
that the copyright owner was likely to develop. A parody may not be
licensed because of the unflattering way it presents a copyrighted
work; but a non-traditional presentation of a work, such as a rap
version of the copyrighted work at issue in Campbell, was considered
a market that the copyright owner could protect, even though
there were no plans to exploit that market at the time of the de
fendant's allegedly infringing use.
As applied in the context of the derivative works right, these
opinions seem to suggest that a derivative use will infringe as long
as that use invades a market that the copyright owner would be
likely to exploit if he or she knew about it. In the context of deriva-·
tive works which "consume" the underlying work, that is, non-pub
lic goods uses, the derivative user may be able to argue that the
copyright owner was already compensated for uses it should have
expected when pricing the first sale of the copyrighted work. How
ever, that argument falters when the derivative use falls outside of
those markets and creates a market that the copyright owner did
not contemplate in pricing the first sale of the copyrighted work,
but to which the copyright owner is entitled as a market he or she
would have been likely to develop.
Thus, the ultimate question to ask in determining if the deriv
ative works right has been infringed by a non-public goods use of a
work is not, "Is the derivative work original?" or, "Has a permanent
144
145
146
147

471 u.s. 539 (1985).
Id. at 592.
510 u.s. 569 (1994).
Id. at 592.
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change been made?", but rather, "Was this a customary use of a
particular work?" This is obviously a fact question appropriately
determined by relevant evidence as to what were customary uses of
such works. 148 It would seem best to place the burden of proof on
the copyright owner to prove that a certain use was not customary
and that therefore the copyright owner did not anticipate the value
that his or her art could have when used in that way. By allocating
the burden in that way, the law will assume that ordinarily the copy
right owner has been able to anticipate such value and has priced
its works accordingly to capture that value. Only where the proof
shows otherwise should the copyright owner be able to seek dam
ages from the derivative user to compensate for that lost value.
IV.

CoNcLusioN

Both courts and commentators have struggled to define the
best approach to use in balancing the rights of copyright owners
with the rights of derivative users in order to best serve the public
interest in creation of and access to original works of authorship.
Giving copyright owners too little control may inhibit the creation
of works by denying those owners the economic rewards needed to
stimulate creation; giving copyright owners too much control may
prevent derivative users from being able to improve and build
upon those underlying works and thus to create new works of au
thorship. Thus, striking the balance in the right way has implica
tions not only for creators of works of authorship, but also for the
public, which benefits from the creation of such works.
In order to strike that balance appropriately, first one must ask
whether the derivative use was a public goods use or not. When
the derivative use is of the "public goods" variety, for example, a
film based on a novel or a plush toy based on a cartoon character,
the creator of that underlying work has not been compensated di
rectly for each use of its work by the derivative user. In such cases,
the derivative use should be considered infringing because the
copyright owner will lose some of the value of his or her art's con
tribution to the derivative work. In statutory terms, the underlying
148 The concept of "customary use" is not foreign to copyright law. The Supreme Court
in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, obseiVed that "the fair use doctrine was predicated on the
author's implied consent to 'reasonable and customary use' when he released his work for
public consumption." See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350
(Ct. Cl. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (stating that scholar's handwritten copy of copy
righted article would be fair use as a "customary fact[] of copyright-life"); Harry N. Rosen
field, Customary Use as "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 220 (1975) (arguing that
customary use of copyrighted works in non-commercial context should be considered per se
fair use).
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work can easily be considered to have been "recast, transformed or
adapted" since by definition some expressive element of that work
is now appearing in a different format or medium. This is so be
cause an actual copy of the work is not in fact incorporated within
that derivative work. It should not matter whether the change is
itself "original."
On the other hand, where the derivative use does incorporate
an actual copy of the underlying work into each copy of the deriva
tive work, the concerns are different. In those cases, as long as that
derivative use is a customary or reasonably expected use of such
works, the copyright owner has had, at least in theory, an opportu
nity to calculate the potential value of his or her art's contribution
to such derivative uses and could have priced that work accordingly
to capture that value. Thus, the law should not allow the copyright
owner to hold that derivative user liable, unless the copyright
owner can prove that the derivative use was not customary or rea
sonably expected and that therefore there was no realistic opportu
nity for the copyright owner to receive compensation for that use
of his or her work.
Returning finally to the tile art scenario at issue in Mirage and
Lee, the use of the note cards is clearly not a public goods use since
every piece of tile art incorporates an actual copy of the underlying
art work. Thus, that use should not be considered infringing, un
less the· artist can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
that use was not customary or reasonably expected at the time the
underlying work was created and distributed.
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